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Book Review
Has the First Amendment Arrived
for Broadcasting?
By Lucas
A. Powe.t Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. Pp. 7,
295. $25.OO

AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

Reviewed by Tom A. Collins*
An understanding of broadcast regulation demands a firm foundation in its social history. With such a foundation, a doctrinal analysis of
broadcast regulation gains both vigor and interest. Lucas A. Powe's
American Broadcasting and the First Amendment provides the foundation necessary to comprehend the regulation of radio and television.
Powe argues that regulation of broadcasting content should parallel and
not extend beyond current regulation of the print media. This highly
readable book not only provides the general audience with a firm understanding of broadcast regulation but also offers the expert a refreshing
presentation of the arguments against broadcast regulation. The result is
an enjoyable, interesting book that fully repays the time spent with it.
The work focuses on the fairness doctrine,1 on the equal access provision of the Communications Act,2 and on the regulation of offensive
speech. Powe presents a convincing case for the rejection of these doctrines. He gives less attention to problems of licensing, and to emerging
t James R. Dougherty Chair & Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
I Hereinafter cited by page number only.
* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. A.B.
1963, J.D. 1969, Indiana University; LL.M. 1970, University of Michigan School of Law.
1. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) abandoned the fairness doctrine in Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 541, 573 (1987), after the
publication ofAmerican Broadcastingand the FirstAmendment. The doctrine required fair coverage
of controversial issues of public importance. It was set forth in Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949) and found constitutional in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969). The Court in Red Lion strongly suggested that the fairness doctrine is
mandated by statute. Id. at 380-81. This statutory mandate could be the basis for a challenge to the
FCC's abandonment of the doctrine.

2. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982).
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technologies that raise issues collateral to those discussed in the book.
More attention to these areas would have been helpful.
Three points form the essence of Powe's argument for the abandonment of broadcast regulation. First, the broadcast media are functionally
analogous to the print media. Second, the first amendment does not justify treating the broadcast media differently. Powe finds the Supreme
Court's rationales for this distinction-scarcity and intrusion-faulty
and finally unavailing. Third, the effort to regulate content has given the
government (and, to a lesser degree, private parties) enormous leverage
against broadcasters in a way that hampers rather than encourages an
open, full debate. I am substantially convinced by Powe's argument, yet
I still have distinct misgivings about the operation and function of
broadcasting.
Before I consider how Powe develops his key argument, I will
sketch my reservations. First, however, I note a major point of agreement: Except for quibbles, the argument that the functions of the press
and broadcasting are the same is compelling. They are. Yet this analogy
is not perfect. Difficulties arise with Powe's description of the abuse of
power and the nature of the media as justifications for regulating potential misuse. The book focuses on the governmental power that results
from this prospective regulation. This focus is correct as a first matter,
but it fails to consider sufficiently the potential for abuse of private power
and the possibility of checking that abuse. The differential impact of
print and broadcasting media on the public may make private abuse of
broadcasting a greater concern than government regulation of it.
I.

Traditional Justifications for Broadcast Regulation

Powe handily disposes of arguments accepted by the Supreme Court
under the first amendment for differential treatment of broadcasting. He
argues that scarcity per se is not enough to justify the special treatment
of broadcasting. 3 Powe further asserts that intrusive/pervasive arguments for special regulation of broadcasting are flawed. 4 Taken together,
these two distinguishing characteristics of the broadcast media do not
justify greater regulation. Like print media, radios and televisions are
voluntarily possessed and used, are subject to an easy-probably easiersupervision by their users or possessors, and yet are no more ubiquitous.
For these reasons, the arguments deployed by the Supreme Court fail.
3. Pp. 200-09. Scarcity of frequencies is the traditional basis for regulation of broadcasting.
See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376; NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
4. Pp. 209-15. The Supreme Court developed the theory of intrusiveness as a basis to ban
offensive speech. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
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Still, broadcasting differs from print in ways that the scarcity justification and the intrusiveness/pervasiveness rationale do not adequately
describe. Powe acknowledges this in his concluding pages and takes this
criticism quite seriously. 5 Yet these differences merit further consideration. We do fear broadcasting, in part because we do not fully understand it.6 Broadcasting does, however, come at us in various ways, and
we comprehend it at various levels. According to figures that Powe accepts, we watch seven hours of television on an average day. 7 We also
listen to radio, especially in cars. Broadcasting is an entertainment medium more than an information medium, 8 and is ephemeral in a sense
that print is not. 9 As a result, contemporary broadcasting is created for
and encourages a short attention span. Television relies heavily on visual
images. It presents prison conditions, riots, or wars more vividly than
any other medium can. The immediacy of this presentation may further
encourage simple reaction and discourage serious reflection.
Like every medium, broadcasting has unique characteristics.
Broadcasting is as much like print as a film of Provence is like Van
Gogh's paintings at Arles. None of them is reality; each presents a reality to some extent determined by the chosen medium. Thus, the media
we choose play a large part in forming our world view. I do not mean
that the medium is the message but rather that the message is deeply
affected by the medium. Despite these differences, and the complexities
inherent in regulation, courts never adequately articulate appropriate
concern and uncertainty in rendering regulatory decisions (perhaps because the judiciary finds uncertainty unbecoming).1 0
In spite of its functional equivalence to the press, broadcasting has a
different effect on us, and, through our government, we have sought to
5. Pp. 248-56. I do not suppose that Powe's opposition to regulation is likely to alter. Given
his demonstration of regulation's failure to promote freedom and of the inadequacy of its stated
rationale, for Powe this position must hold the high ground.
6. Pp. 214-15. Powe suggests that we regulate television because it is powerful and because,
unlike print, "we are not... sure what the medium is doing to us." P. 214. But we understand the
print media only partially.
7. P. 211 (citing 1986 BROADCASTING-CABLECASTING YEARBOOK A-2). The figure of course
is as facially incredible as it is generally accepted. If we sleep eight, work eight, and watch seven,
only one hour is left for washing, eating, procreating, and such. Of course, weekends, vacations, and
holidays increase the time available for viewing, and we can do most things while watching. Nevertheless, accepted numbers like this do warrant thought and comment.
8. This assertion, like assertions of media concentration and scarcity, depends on how one
counts media. If we compare television only with newspaper, television is more of an entertainment
medium than newspaper. But if we include all print, the difference is far from clear. Entertainment
is the goal of most books, as well as of most magazines.
9. While newscasts can be recorded, the viewer or listener does not usually replay them (as the
reader does with newspapers when she wants to understand more clearly the information presented).
10. Rather, the Supreme Court has relied either on the scarcity rationale or the intrusiveness
rationale. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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control that effect. Red Lon Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,1 1 the leading
Supreme Court case on broadcast regulation, makes two important
points. First, the Court recognized that "[t]he general problems raised
by a technology which supplants atomized, relatively informal communication with mass media as a prime source of national cohesion and news
12 Problems of range aind impact argue for some sort of regulation:
When two people converse face to face, both should not speak
at once if either is to be clearly understood. But the range of the
human voice is so limited that there could be meaningful communications if half the people in the United States were talking and
the other half listening. Just as clearly, half the people might publish and the other half read. But the reach of radio signals is incomparably greater than. the range of the human
voice and the
13
problem of interference is a massive reality.
The Court then characterizes the first amendment right primarily as a
"collective" one retained by "the people as a whole." 1 4
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimalely prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee.... It is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas
15
and experiences which is crucial here.
The Court also speaks straightforwardly of the licensee's right to freedom from censorship and of the public's right to diversity. Neither right
is necessarily inconsistent with itself, nor inconsistent with freedom generally, nor inconsistent with freedom of speech and press. This characterization of interests contemplates a hierarchy, a rational exchange on
controversial issues with the Court as a mediator of first amendment
rights.
11, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Powe discusses Red Lion throughout the book. For the key points of
his position, see pp. 121-41.
The courts have a strong tradition of treating different media differently. See, eg., Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The moving picture screen, the radio, the
newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values,
abuses and dangers."). The development of this tradition paralleled the development of broadcasting. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210 (1943) (describing the evolution of broadcasting).
The Court fully recognized this development in Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-87.
12. 395 U.S. at 386 n.15.
13. Id. at 387-88. The Court has rejected the possibility of a traffic management approach,
which addresses only the technological problems. NBC, 319 U.S. at 215-16.
14. 395 U.S. at 390.
15. Id. (citations omitted).
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II.

Controlling Private Abuse of Power

Those who advocate regulation of the broadcast or other media fear
the implications of Red Lion; while they view government power with
trepidation, they believe regulations are necessary to control powerful
and potentially monopolistic industries. These fears reinforce, and are
reinforced by, fears of a new medium of communication. Government is
often the means used in efforts to control private power; much of what
government does is intended to control or ameliorate private abuse, and
the government sometimes succeeds. Nevertheless, whether the government can effectively contain private power is uncertain.
Powe characterizes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as a
rubber stamp of the FCC, a booster of its regulatory efforts. 16 I disagree
with this harsh assessment. The court has often acted to promote diversity of viewpoints. In Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. FCC,for example, the court reversed the FCC's ruling, granted
consumer standing, and acted for a broader presentation of views.17 In
Banzhaf v. FCC, however, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the FCC's order
that required reply advertising to cigarette commercials.1 8 According to
the FCC, media owners had failed to provide a balance to the advertisements of their powerful customers that urged consumption of a healthimpairing product. 19 Those seeking regulation want to curb such private
abuse but, as Powe demonstrates, they are rarely successful. 20 Ironically,
regulation is more likely to exacerbate private abuse. In GreaterBoston
Television Corp. v. FCC, the court endorsed the FCC enforcement of
rules encouraging diverse ownership. 2 1 A year later, the court threw out
rules designed to prevent the application of the GreaterBoston decision
by permitting an applicant for an established license effectively to chal22
lenge the incumbent.
In cases involving format changes, the D.C. Circuit reversed the
FCC many times and acted to preserve unique, financially viable formats
that acquiring licensees would have abandoned. In Home Box Office v.
FCC, the court opened cable television to pay channels. 23 In Business
Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC,the court struck down a ban

."

16. For example, Powe states, "The D.C. Circuit, as usual, swallowed the Commission position
P. 97.
17. 359 F.2d 994, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
18. 405 F.2d 1082, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
19. Id. at 1086.
20. Pp. 211-12.
21. 444 F.2d 841, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
22. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
23. 567 F.2d 9, 49 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
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on public issue announcements. 24 In Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, the
court again sided with the licensee. 25 One can clearly see from these
cases a willingness by the D.C. Circuit to side with the FCC against the
licensee coupled with a willingness to act in favor of diversity and against
either public or private censorship. Powe's argument against government regulation assumes that licensees which receive a court's carte
blanche will provide better broadcasting than they would without it. The
decisions suggest that greater diversity at times may have resulted from
the D.C. Circuit's willingness to rule against the licensee, often with no
censorship of either party and almost always with no censorship of ideas.
The nature of the broadcast media and the fear of private power
finally may serve more to explain the fears and motivations of those who
desire regulations than to justify the regulations themselves. Powe demonstrates that the FCC regulatory scheme is a blunt instrument that can
be, and often is, abused. We can easily express in general terms our concern about broadcasting, but our concern eludes the kind of clear articulation that facilitates a fair and effective regulatory scheme. Before
discussing the ramifications of these observations, I turn to Powe's artful
presentation of the problems of the current approach.
III.

The Fairness Doctrine and Content Regulation

Powe captures the nature of the problem of broadcast regulation in
his descriptions of two famous cases involving contentious, controversial
ministers from two different eras of broadcasting regulation. 2 6 Although
only four decades separate the cases, their times were markedly different.
The first case, Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Commission,27 occurred in 1932. The Reverend Bob Schuler, an early radio
preacher, had attacked the local power structure and the Roman Catholic church, among others. The FRC revoked the station's license because
of the lack of balance in its presentation. Basing its decision solely on the
general public interest, the F].RC asserted that a radio station could not be
used to promote only the view of its licensee. The D.C. Circuit
28
affirmed.
24. 450 F.2d 642, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973).
25. 556 F.2d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The D.C. Circuit invalidated
an FCC order that prohibited broadcasting indecent language over the radio when children may be
in the audience. Id.
26. Pp. 13-21, 92-96.
27. 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); see pp. 13-21.
28. 62 F.2d at 852.
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The second case, Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC,29 involved
the revocation of a license held by the Reverend Carl McIntire's organization. WXUR operated in the 1960s and early 1970s under a more mature system of regulation. McIntire presented a relentlessly right-wing
schedule of programs. In its decision to revoke the station's license, the
FCC relied on the fairness doctrine and the station's misrepresentations
to the FCC about efforts to comply with the fairness doctrine. The D.C.
Circuit, which had earlier affirmed Trinity Methodist Church on the
ground that the licensee's programming was not in the public interest,
now chose to affirm the revocation because of the owner's violation of
the fairness doctrine and its misrepresentations to the FCC, and avoided
30
the issue of controversial programming.
More chilling than the regulation exercised in these two cases, however, were the efforts of the Nixon administration to use the FCC's licensing and regulatory authority to pressure the networks and the
Washington Post.3I The President's views and no others (or as little of
those others as possible) were to get through. Those who remember
Richard Nixon as villain should also recall-as Powe makes abundantly
clear-that Nixon carried forward a tradition that John Kennedy and his
33
administration began, 32 culminating in the Red Lion decision.
This differential treatment in broadcasting of "official" and "unofficial" political views, which would be completely protected in the print
media, marks the FCC approach. While its abuse of unpopular viewpoints is disturbing, the FCC approach goes beyond attacks on the unpopular and extends to attacks on the popular and offbeat. Jerry
Garcia, 34 leader of the Grateful Dead (which the FCC called a "rock and
roll musical group" 35), was the focus of an attack by the agency on offensive speech.3 6 The FCC's attack occurred in the absence of any specific
29. 473 F.2d 16, 63-80 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); see pp. 92-96.
30. 473 F.2d at 52, 60. In vigorous dissent, Judge Bazelon questioned the propriety and constitutionality of the fairness doctrine. Id. at 63-81.
31. See pp. 121-41.
32. See pp. 113-14. The Eisenhower administration also used questionable conduct in issuing
licenses to political allies. See pp. 75-84.
33. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see supratext accompanying notes
11-15.
34. See pp. 161-90. Jerry Garcia and the Grateful Dead were, and are, very popular. In 1970,
however, they were not in the cultural mainstream of the United States. Today their classification is
more difficult. I am tempted to describe them as a cultural artifact of the 1970s. They are, however,
a phenomenon in that they remain popular today. The Dead had their first top ten single this
summer. "Touch of Grey," BILLBOARD MAG., Sept. 19, 1987, at 84.
35. WUHY-FM, E. Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 408 (1970).
36. Id.; see pp. 174-76. This attack on offensive speech disturbed Commissioner Nicholas
Johnson, who observed:
What this Commission condemns today are not words, but a culture-a lifestyle it fears
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complaint about a particular broadcast, 37 while it ignored numerous
complaints about Laugh-In, a highly popular and innovative television
comedy program. 38 Perhaps, as Commissioner Nicholas Johnson suggested, the FCC considered the presenting licensees and not simply the
offensive material. Jerry Garcia appeared on Eastern Educational Radio
of Philadelphia, an award-winning educational station that could
"scarcely afford the postage to answer" FCC inquiries. 39 Laugh-In appeared on NBC, 4° which could easily afford to answer and defend against
charges from the FCC. Perhaps the variety of its vignettes redeemed
Laugh-In: Bobbi Gentry in a bikini and Richard Nixon dressed for Wall
Street are arguably more tasteful than Jerry Garcia.
The FCC's treatment cf the Pacifica Foundation presents a vivid
picture of oppressive regulation. Pacifica has broadcast authors such as
Edward Albee 4 ' and comedians such as George Carlin, 42 as well as
roundtables on homosexualty and a Bloomsday reading from James
Joyce's Ulysses.4 3 In this last case, Pacifica sought special permission to
read from the book 44 after the FCC's latest pronouncement on offensive
speech.45 The FCC refused either to grant or deny permission to air the
reading, stating that Pacifica must take responsibility for its own decision. 46 These examples represent just a few of the many times Pacifica
stations have been cited for -violating FCC standards.
Powe's analysis of the legal theories used to justify regulating the
because it does not understand.... Many [of those under 28] will "smile" when they learn
that the Federal Communications Commission, an agency of their government, has punished a radio station for broadcasting the words of Jerry Garcia, the leader of what the
FCC calls a "rock and roll musical group." To call The Grateful Dead a "rock and roll
musical group" is like calling the Los Angeles Philharmonic a "jug band." And that about
shows "where this Commission's at."
24 F.C.C.2d at 422 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). Powe and the FCC both erroneously characterize the objections to offensive speech as an aspect of WASP or white middle-class culture. In the
1970s Jerry Garcia appealed to a culture largely inhabited by young WASPs, and today he appeals to
a great many older WASPs. Despite this appeal, many people of all classes, races, and religions
neither habitually include the word "fuck" in their conversation, nor particularly want to hear it.
37. 24 F.C.C.2d at 408 n.2, 418 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring and dissenting).
38. Id. at 421.
39. Id. at 423. (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
40. Id.
41. 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964).
42. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978). Pacifica broadcast George Carlin's
"Filthy Words" monologue, and a listener complained. The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's determination that the monologue was indecent. Id. at 735.
43. Letter to William J. Byrnes, Esq. (Joyce), 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 216, 217 (1987). Bloomsday is June 16, the day on which Ulysses took place.
44. Specifically, Pacifica sought approval for readings from the Penelope section, which contains several terms that the FCC usually finds objectionable. Id. at 216.
45. New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast & Amateur Radio
Licensees, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 218 (1987).
46. Id. at 1219.
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content of broadcasts and his examination of the social history of regulation combine to make the most powerful argument possible against content regulation. Powe, however, passes over a major point in the
analysis: some regulation is intended to extend free speech. This thesis is
central to the work of Jerome Barron 47 and Lee Bollinger.4 But while
Powe acknowledges and discusses these two seminal articles, 49 he does
not incorporate their argument into his own. For example, although the
regulation of offensive speech is meant to exclude or to censor, Communications Act section 315 is meant to assure equal terms of access (not
equal access).50
The fairness doctrine was meant to encourage a balanced presentation of views, rather than to censor. To a substantial degree, however,
censorship is the result of all three forms of regulation. For example, the
FCC has suppressed offensive speech to some degree. Section 315 has
affected the coverage of political campaigns. On the other hand, no one
has shown that the fairness doctrine actually suppresses speech. 51 While
pressures on broadcasters are expected and do occur, I doubt whether
empirical data can establish that the fairness doctrine has such broad
effects. Ultimately, we must rely on our own perceptions of the role and
nature of the media in order to determine the proper regulatory scheme.
If we believe that the media should present diverse, uncensored views,
then regulation of offensive speech may be much more threatening than
the fairness doctrine. Indeed, while the fairness doctrine may chill (this
is the essence of Powe's argument 52), it may also open broadcasting to
more diverse views.
Most commentators are less than fully satisfied with the performance of radio and television as competitors in "the marketplace of
47. See, eg., Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv.
1641, 1666 (1967) (advocating recognition of a first amendment right to mandatory access).
48. See, eg., Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and PublicAccess: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. Rav. 1, 2 (1976) (stating that legislative access regulations should be applied to one segment of the media to assure achievement of first amendment
goals).
49. See pp. 4-6.
50. See Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982). The decision to grant access is made by
the licensee, but once access is granted, it must be on equal terms with any access granted to other
candidates.
51. The Supreme Court observed nearly twenty years ago in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC:
"[I]f experience with the administration of [the fairness doctrine and personal attack rules] indicates
that they have the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage,
there will be time enough to reconsider the constitutional implications. The fairness doctrine in the
past has had no such overall effect." 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969). Evidence of such an effect by the
fairness doctrine is still lacking.
52. See pp. 111-20.
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ideas."'5 3 Powe's argument that the fairness doctrine contributes in a
substantial way to the bland., uncontroversial coverage of public affairs is
convincing. An alternate explanation, however, exists. The media seek
large audiences and thus have chosen to avoid presenting disturbing or
offensive material. As a result, broadcasters sacrifice controversy and
inspired coverage of public affairs to their desire for higher Nielsen
ratings.
Given the many factors that influence programming decisions, however, we cannot be certain that any approach works better than any other
as a way of promoting diversity. Developing empirical data about the
effect of television, radio, or print approaches the impossible. Researchers cannot create control groups for a phenomenon as embedded in our
culture as broadcasting. The best approach may be interviews of varying
sophistication. But these rely heavily on individual memory and reflections, which are often dubious. Because we have so little reliable empirical information, we often adopt the media's view that most closely
reflects our personal philosophy or analysis.
Any discussion of the first amendment should recognize that the
media's greatest good is not challenging cultural or political presentations, but its presence as a check on government power. Thus, the real
focus of the discussion should be whether FCC regulations effectively
encourage diversity and debates. Powe's arguments approach this issue
by asserting the no-censorship principle, 54 but they do not decide it. I
would, however, emphasize the importance of private power in the media
and the differential impact of the various media on their audiences.
Any effective control of content presents problems. Just how to
fashion such control and still comply with the Constitution is unclear.
The entire, subtle, and inevitable push of broadcasting, particularly of
television, is its depiction of what affects society-the very influences
that most offend those who want regulation. Even with a critical focus
on drugs, violence, indecency, or sexual innuendo, these vices are embedded in the programs offered. Great intrusion would be necessary to control them.5 5 Powe demonstrates the elusive nature of the effort to control
content when he recites attempts by the FCC to proscribe as prodrug,
lyrics meant to be antidrug and to prevent Puff the Magic Dragon from
53. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
54. P. 248.
55. But such control is possible. The Hays Code controlled motion pictures in considerable
detail for decades, until its demise in the 1950s. See R. MOLEY, THE HAYS OFFICE 77-88 (1945).
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leading the nation's youth to untoward conduct.5 6 These examples illustrate that regulation of content is likely to be either tediously detailed or
to rely on ad terrorem measures. Such efforts for the most part died with
the first era of regulation, which passed in the 1950s. We should not
resurrect them.
Powe's arguments concerning direct control of program content are
convincing. I find his comprehensive discussions of FCC control of offensive speech,5 7 as well as his more limited discussion of section 315,58
particularly persuasive. But the fairness doctrine is more problematic. I
am among those "youthful law professors" who, Powe observes, eagerly
embraced the doctrine in the 1970s, 5 9 and I am hesitant to abandon it.
Indeed, if the fairness doctrine worked as well in reality as it does in
abstraction, I would not. But Powe's fuller explanation of its history and
application emphasizes the limits of this abstract doctrine. He makes
clear that the fairness doctrine is not essential to a system of full expression, although he does not finally convince me that it is unconstitutional.
Following the FCC's abandonment of the fairness doctrine last summer, 60 the best course for Congress is to leave this arena to the operation
of private forces. Probably the content of broadcasts will change so little
that most viewers and listeners will not notice a difference, and fewer still
will be concerned about it. If significant change does occur, Congress
can legislate, and if necessary, the Supreme Court can rule on the constitutional issues. The real differences among the various media are sufficient and the underlying goals of the doctrine are such that any similar
regulations should survive constitutional scrutiny in the face of abuse by
licensees.
IV.

Content Regulation by the Marketplace of Ideas

Indirect control of programming may succeed when direct control
has failed. The general approach to indirect control attempts to increase
programming sources. Yet these indirect efforts to encourage diversity
have failed in much the same way as the direct controls that Powe describes. I will briefly sketch past and present efforts to achieve diversity
in broadcasting, then turn to cable systems, which I believe offer much
hope for the future of the communication media.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
(1987).

Pp. 179-80.
Pp. 162-90.
Pp. 142-61.
P. 146. In fact, I first became interested in the doctrine as a student.
Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 541, 573
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The key goal underlying the idea of diverse sources is the construc61
tion of a marketplace of ideas. This metaphor constitutes both an ideal
62
and a romantic myth. As an ideal, the marketplace would present all
views fully and effectively. In theory, democratic dialogue in the marketplace determines the worth of ideas and the place they are to occupy in
our culture. The properly functioning marketplace will traffic all ideas
without censorship. The fairness doctrine, which dictates that broadcasters present all facets of controversial issues fairly, is a good, shorthand
statement of the ideal. 63 One can dispute how closely the multitude of
regulated and unregulated media and of informal communications approaches the romantic ideal; 64 doubtless, it falls short. We can come
closer to this ideal by merely increasing the number of voices, especially
65
the voices of the relatively imnpecunious.
In the past, the FCC has tried several approaches to increase participation in the broadcasting irdustry. It has limited existing ownership in
particular markets, limited syndication of programs, limited networks'
distribution of their programs to local affiliates, limited the total number
of radio and television staticns that a single entity may own, 66 and used
diversity of ownership as a major criterion in awarding licenses.
No doubt these efforts :have increased the sources of programs, but
we are less certain that they have also increased the diversity of views.
Increasing the diversity of sources may mean merely that multiple
sources will produce more of the same type of programs. Our market
system emphasizes business profit. The economics of broadcasting determine to a large degree how many media outlets will exist, what they will
present, and who will view and listen. As Powe points out, private market forces as well as the federal licensing scheme limit the number of
61. See Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A LegitimatizingMyth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 16.
62. See Barton, supra note 47, at 1642.
63. Ingber questions the effectiveness of all equal access proposals, Ingber, supranote 61, at 51,
whereas Barron's article is modeled on the tenets of the fairness doctrine, Barron, supra note 47.
64. See Barton, supra note 47, at 1644-47 (asserting that changes in communication technology
create barriers to wide dissemination ol diverse views); Ingber, supra note 61, at 16-49 (questioning
the ideal in detail).
65. Of course a proposal to increase the number of sources does not protect the poorest segments of society. As the Supreme Court observed when it rejected a proposal for a mandatory right
to purchase advertisements, only the relatively prosperous would benefit. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123 (1973). I know of no feasible way to give everyone access. A free public
access channel may help, but it is likely to be regarded as a place for eccentrics and little viewed.
Perhaps call-in shows or televised public meetings would increase access for the less prosperous.
Here I would accept some effort tow-xd this end and would not demand perfection. The Cable
Communication Act provided for the establishment and editorial autonomy of public access channels. 47 U.S.C. § 532(a), (c)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
66. Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 7.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of the Commission's Rule Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 100
F.C.C.2d 17 (1984), reconsidered in 100 F.C.C.2d 75 (1985).
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radio and television stations. 67

Cable television, with its many channels, offers a strong fulcrum to
encourage diversity of views. As Powe amply demonstrates, we should
not burden cable with direct government regulation, although many
might prefer that we do so. 68 The best approach to cable is a common-

carrier system, 69 which Powe believes would avoid first amendment
problems. 70 Cable technology offers wide potential. It makes dozens of
channels both possible and financially viable and permits the presentation of diverse cultural, political, and social views. Although cable offers
us a means to achieve this diversity, we are not using it to this end. As
Powe demonstrates, the FCC has hampered cable for years.7 1 Now Congress, in its rejection of a common-carrier system, 72 has done the same
thing.
The goal of the first amendment is to maximize freedom through
free expression. A cable common-carrier system will encourage the freedom and diversity necessary to this end. A cable system under single
ownership, however, will create a monopoly stronger than that feared
and denounced in Red on 73and probably impair rather than encourage
freedom. In creating a common-carrier system, we should recognize the
community's role in creating the wherewithal for cable communications.
The technology that makes cable possible is the result of the accumulated
knowledge of people working in laboratories, schools, and universities.
Full exploitation of this knowledge depends on the award of franchises
with the power to use public rights of way and easements. The cable
industry, as much as any emerging enterprise, draws on a common heritage of knowledge and cooperation from its community, yet cable system
owners earn and deserve recompense. They have sufficient vision to be
in the business, they have the skill to arrange financing, and they must
possess and use the managerial and technical capabilities required to operate the systems. These skills deserve the rewards necessary to call
them forth; they do not, however, deserve a quasi-monopoly of
communication.
Rather than searching for the best approach to cable regulation,
courts are currently trying to choose between the broadcast model and
67. Pp. 203-04.
68. Powe discusses all aspects of cable television. See pp. 218-47.
69. See I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 2 (1983). "The right of access is what defines a
common carrier: it is obligated to serve all on equal terms without discrimination." Id.
70. P. 246.
71. Pp. 216-32.
72. 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (Supp. III 1985).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
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the print model. 74 This blinks reason. Cable is neither broadcasting nor
print. It requires its own model adapted to its own unique characteristics. Cable, with its large number of channels, offers society a degree of
freedom we have never had; yet the courts still argue over what kind of
monopoly they will grant. 75 Cable television, especially with limited
must-carry rules,7 6 frightens the television industry because of its potential to fragment markets and to exclude less popular television stations.
Economic realism thus temp -rs the ideal of diversity. A NationalReview
or Mother Jones of the air is unlikely to develop an audience large enough
to attract current cable systems, although such a program might generate
an audience large enough to support independent syndication. If we fear
power and dread its abuse, whether private or governmental, the control
of so much potential communication must frighten us.
A common-carrier system alleviates both concerns. Such a system
need not choose whom to carry, take financial risks on innovative
presentations, nor judge what is appropriate for the community. Rather,
vendors of programs choose what they think people want, offer it, and
take the financial risk themselves. Even a partial common-carrier system
can create the benefits of diversity while avoiding the problems of control. It also can diffuse private power by defeating monopoly and establishing a number of uncensored voices. Its multiple sources augment
diversity without direct governmental concern with program content.
V.

Conclusion

Powe concludes his work with an emphasis on the virtues of tradition. 77 The core first amendment tradition is an absence of government
censorship. Both cases and legislation concerning broadcasting reflect
this tradition. The marketplace of ideas is a similar ideal, although most
people recognize that our marketplace is imperfect. The history of
broadcast regulation chronicles attempts to ameliorate these imperfections. We fear the danger this kind of intervention may bring. Regulation of offensive speech and political campaigns does little to correct such
imperfections. The fairness doctrine may well be an unneeded relic of
74. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1403-11
(9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the broadcast model), aff'd, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). Powe notes the debate.
See pp. 242-44. He seems to prefer a print model, see pp. 240-44, but notes that Congress could
require a common-carrier system, p. 246.
75. Pp. 225-47.
76. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Television
Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Sys., 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 792 (1986), modified, 62 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1251 (1987).
77. P. 256.
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another era. Although we rightly fear excessive content regulation and
the excesses in early cable regulation, we should not let these fears prevent us from seeking a better approach. Now that the FCC has abandoned the fairness doctrine, we should observe the operation of broadcast
media without it. Appropriate action, if necessary, can come later. Imposing a common-carrier obligation on cable systems, and removing private barriers to diversity without additional content regulation may
present the best tools for achieving an informed forum. Powe's thorough, well-argued book does not bring me into complete agreement with
him, but it does define three points I cannot dispute: first, the need to be
wary of government regulation; second, the need to avoid excessive intervention; and third, the need to achieve an effective presentation of diverse ideas.
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